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Abstract
I study the interactions between the distribution of human capital, technological choice,
and redistributive institutions. I ﬁrst ask what makes alternative social contracts such as
a European-style “welfare state” and US-style “laissez-faire” sustainable, and in particular
how each is affected by skill-biased technical change. I then endogenize technological or
organizational choice, and show that ﬁrms respond to greater human capital heterogeneity
with more ﬂexible technologies that further exacerbate wage equality. I then analyze the
simultaneous determination of technology, income distribution, and redistributive institutions,
and as well as spillovers between the social contracts of different countries.
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1
In this paper I examine the interactions between income inequality, technological choice,
and redistributive policies or institutions. This research, which is developed more fully in
Bénabou (2002), brings together two main sets of issues. The ﬁrst one concerns the political
economy of redistribution: why is the social contract –taxes and transfers, unemployment and
health insurance, education ﬁnance, and labor market regulation– so different across countries
with similar economic and political fundamentals, such as the United States and Europe?
In particular, what makes the Welfare State sustainable, and what shocks might cause it to
unravel?
2 The second theme is that of technological change and wage inequality. Over the last
20 years, many countries have experienced a signiﬁcant rise in wage inequality –particularly
the United States and Great-Britain, which also have some of the more “laissez-faire” social
contracts. This rise in inequality is usually attributed to three main factors: skill-biased
technical change, international trade(about which Ishall have nothing to say), and institutional
change, such as the decline of unions and the erosion of minimum wage.
3 The latter, however,
are largely endogenous policy outcomes, and indeed evolved quite differently in Continental
Europe (or Canada) compared to the United States. Conversely, it has been argued that the
skill bias in technological and organizational innovations is itself endogenous, responding in
particular to changes in the distribution of skills.
4
In what follows I present a simple model of human capital accumulation, technology
choice and redistributive policy, in which all three are potentially interdependent, and use it to
study the set of questions raised above. I seek in particular to identify the main mechanisms
that allow different societal forms to perpetuate themselves, as well as the forces pushing
toward convergence.
1 This paper was prepared for the session on “The Dynamics of the Welfare State” of the Annual Congress
of the European Economic Association, Venice, August 2002. Email: rbenabou@princeton.edu
2 See, e.g., Bénabou (2000), Saint Paul (2001) and Hassler et al. (2002), who also examine the impact of
technical change.
3 See, e.g., Freeman (1995), Fortin and Lemieux (1997), Lee (1999).
4 See, e.g., Kremer and Maskin (1996), Acemoglu (1998), (2002), Kiley (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Thes-
mar and Thoenig (2000), and Vindigini (2002). Relatedly, Grossman and Maggi (2000) show how the skill
distribution matters for international specialization, and Legros and Newman (1996) how the wealth distribution
affects the organization of ﬁrms.8
2. Inequality and the Social Contract
My starting point is the politico-economic model in Bénabou (2000), based on
imperfections in asset markets (for credit and insurance) and in the political system (the
inﬂuence of wealth). There is a continuum i ∈ [0,1] of overlapping generations. Adults
produce output, using their own human capital ki
t and effort li

















Later on I shall introduce a richer production structure, where agents with different skill
levels perform complementary tasks and the degree of substitutability between them may
be optimally chosen by ﬁrms. Adults care about their own consumption, leisure, and the















t+1 represents random ability and ei
t iseducational investment. There isno loan market




t+1 could be diversiﬁed away. In every period, before the productivity shocks zi
t are realized,
adults collectively determine, through the political process, a rate of redistribution τt ≤ 1
to which they will be subject. This τt may represent progressivity in taxes and transfers,
in education ﬁnance, or in wage policy. Since, empirically, rich agents have more political
inﬂuence than poor ones (higher propensities to vote, lobby, make campaign contributions,
etc.), I allow the rank of the pivotal voter in the income distribution to be some p∗ ≥ 50%.
Equivalently, I measure the degree of wealth-bias in the political system by λ ≡ Φ−1(p∗) ≥ 0,
where Φ(·) denotes the c.d.f. of a standard normal.
The essence of the model can now be summarized by two key relationships between
inequality and redistribution. These are illustrated by the solid lines in Figure 1, where the
horizontal axis measures the variance ∆ of log-human capital, and the vertical axis the degree
of redistribution τ.9
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1.The two key relationships between inequality and redistribution (solid lines), and the effects of an increase in the returns
to human capital (dashed lines).
• From inequality to redistribution. In each period, the equilibrium policy is a U-shaped
function τt = T(γ∆t) of income inequality. The crucial downward-sloping part reﬂects the
incompleteness of asset markets, which implies that redistribution helps provide insurance and
relax the credit constraints impeding investment. When distributional conﬂict γ∆t is small
enough relative to these ex-ante welfare gains (net of tax distortions), there is widespread
support for redistributive policies, resulting in a high equilibrium τt. As inequality rises,
however, so does the fraction of agents rich enough to oppose such policies, and this forces
down the equilibrium level of τt. At very high levels of inequality, ﬁnally, the standard
skewness effect eventually dominates: beyond ∆ rising numbers of poor impose increasing
levels of redistribution, whether efﬁcient or inefﬁcient. Another intuitive property of the
policy-outcome locus T(·) is that it shifts down when the degree of wealth-bias in the political
system, λ, increases.
• From redistribution to inequality. The downward-sloping curve ∆ = D(τ;γ) reﬂects the
intergenerational transmission mechanism. Due to the credit constraints bearing on poorer
agents, the law of motion for human capital inequality is of the form ∆t+1 = D(∆t,τt;γ),
with D increasing in parental background disparities ∆t and decreasing in the rate of ﬁscal
or educational redistribution τt. Thus, in the long-run (steady-state), human wealth inequality
declines with redistribution, as indicated by the locus ∆ = D(τ;γ) in Figure 1.10
This simple graph makes clear that the two loci can have several intersections, resulting
in multiple (stable) politico-economic steady-states. It also suggests (and I establish in
Bénabou (2000)) the speciﬁc conditions under which this occurs:
(a) the ex–ante welfare beneﬁts of redistribution must be high enough, relative to the
costs. Otherwise, the range over which the T (·) locus is declining will be too narrow to allow
for multiple intersections.
(b) the political power of the wealthy must lie in some intermediate range. If λ is
too large (too small), T (·) will be shifted down too low (up too high) resulting in a unique
equilibrium with high inequality and low redistribution (or vice-versa).
The model can thus account for the coexistence of a generous “Welfare State” in certain
countries and amuch more“Laissez-Faire”social contractin others thathavesimilareconomic
and political fundamentals. Moreover, it predicts a negative correlationbetweeninequalityand
redistribution across them –as one indeed observes between the United States and Europe, and
among OECD countries in general (Pineda and Rodriguez (2000)). It also offers a natural role
for historical events: temporary shocks to the distribution of wealth (immigration, educational
discrimination) or the political system (slavery, voting rights restrictions) can permanently
move society to a different path. For instance, the model provides an intuitive formalization of
the thesis of Engerman and Sokoloff (1998), who point to different initial conditions in terms
of inequality (∆0) and the concentration of power (λ0) as the key factors that set South and
North America on a very different development courses.
One can also show that either of the two social contracts (which are never Pareto-
rankable) can result in faster long-run growth, depending on the tradeoff between tax
distortions and the productivity gains from reallocating investments (e.g., education health)
towards poorer, more credit–constrained agents.
3. Technology and Redistributive Institutions
3.1 Skill-Biased Technical Change and the Viability of the Welfare State
I now examine the role of technology in determining which social contracts are
sustainable in the long run. As illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 1, skill-biased
technical change –an exogenous increase in γ–a f f e c t sb o t ho ft h ek e yc u r v e si nt h em o d e l .
The intergenerational-transmission locus ∆ = D(τ;γ) shifts up: for any given τ and initial11
0
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2.Technology, political inﬂuence, and the social contract; ¯ τ = “Welfare State”, τ = “Laissez
Faire”.
∆t there is more inequality in incomes, hence also in investments, and consequently more
inequality of human capital in the long run. As to the policy locus τ = T(γ∆), it shifts down
over [0,∆) and up over (∆,+∞):since what matters for the political outcome is income
inequality γ∆, an increase in γ for given ∆ has the same U-shaped effect on τ as an increase
in ∆ for given γ.
Figure 1 suggests that a rise in the return to skill can have, in the long run, very drastic
consequences for redistributive institutions: starting from a situation with multiple steady-
states, anincreaseinγ tendstounderminethesustainabilityofthe“WelfareState”equilibrium.
Similarly, starting from a conﬁguration with a single “Welfare-State” it can make a second,
“Laissez-Faire” equilibrium appear. To simplify the formal analysis, I shall restrict voters to a
choice between two policies:
5
• a generous “Welfare State” social contract, corresponding to a high rate of
redistribution ¯ τ ∈ (0,1);
• a more “Laissez Faire” social contract, corresponding to a low rate of redistribution
τ ∈ (0,¯ τ).
Proposition 1 There exist two thresholds γ(λ) < ¯ γ(λ) < 1, both decreasing in λ, such that:
i) for γ < γ(λ), the unique steady-state is (¯ τ,D(¯ τ;γ));
5 I also abstract from labor supply distortions, and impose additional technical conditions; see Bénabou
(2002).12




, both (¯ τ,D(¯ τ;γ)) and (τ,D(τ;γ)) are steady-states;
iii) for γ > ¯ γ(λ), (τ,D(τ;γ)) is the unique steady-state.
As illustrated in Figure 2, these results conﬁrm that the Welfare State becomes
unsustainable when technology becomes too skill-biased, and that multiple social contracts
can coexist only when γ is in some intermediate range. They also reveal an interesting
interaction between the production and political “technologies”. For instance, in a country
with relatively little wealth-bias, the welfare state is –for better of for worse– much more
“immune” to skill-biased technical change than in one where λ is higher. Similarly, a given
change in the political system will have very different effects on redistributive institutions,
depending on how skill-biased the technology is.
3.2 Endogenous Technological and Organizational Flexibility
I now consider the reverse mechanism, namely how inequality itself feeds back onto the
natureoftechnicalchange, makingγ endogenous. Recognizingthatindividualsdonotproduce
in isolation, I formalize production interactions using a simple specialization structure, similar
to that in Bénabou (1996). Final output is produced by competitive ﬁrms, using a continuum
of differentiated inputs or tasks:








, σ ≥ 1, (3)
where xt(s) denotes the quantity of input s, zt(s) an i.i.d. sectoral shock, and At aT F P
parameter. Workers specialize in a single task; facing downward-sloping demand curves, each
chooses a different one, s(i)=i, and produces xi
t = ki
t li
t units. Simple calculations yield the
corresponding input price pi
t, hourly wage ωi
t = pi
t ki




































This is just as in the earlier model, with γ ≡ (σ − 1)/σ and δ =1 , except for the productivity





σ, which workers and voters take as given. The distributional dynamics
and political equilibrium thus remain essentially unchanged, and so do the corresponding
D(τ;γ) and T(γ∆) loci.13
Consider now ﬁrms. In equilibrium, all workers supply the same effort li
t = lt, and
the distribution of human capital remains lognormal, lnki
t ∼ N(mt,∆2
t). The output of a
representative ﬁrm is thus:





















Keeping average human capital constant, the loss e−∆2
t/2σ makes apparent the productivity
costs imposed by (excessive) heterogeneity of the labor force: poorly educated, insufﬁciently
skilled production and clerical workers will drag down the productivity of engineers, managers
and scientists (and vice-versa). We also see that a production technology with greater
substitutability between the tasks performed by different types of workers reduces the costs
of labor force heterogeneity (Bénabou (1996), Grossman and Maggi (2000)). Indeed, this
greater ﬂexibility allows ﬁrms to more easily substitute towards the more productive workers.





t. One can also
think of a higher σ as a more discriminating search technology, resulting in more assortative
matching between workers –that is, in a more segregated production structure (Kremer and
Maskin (1996)).
I now model ﬁrms’ decisions with respect to the degree of ﬂexibility in their
technology or organizational form. Abstracting from the intertemporal (investment) aspects
of technological innovations, I simply assume that ﬁrms can choose from a menu of available
technologies, with different elasticities of substitution σ ∈ [1,+∞) and costs c(σ); the latter
result in a TFP factor A(σ)=e−c(σ), with c0 > 0 and c00 > 0. Given the distribution of
workers’ human capital (mt,∆2
t) and the technology σt used by other ﬁrms, each one chooses
its own technology ˆ σ as a best response.
Proposition 2 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in technological choice. The more
heterogenous the workforce, the more ﬂexible and inegalitarian the technology used by ﬁrms:
σt = σ∗(∆t), with 0 < ∂ lnσ∗/∂ ln∆ < 1.
This result has several interesting implications. First, the return to human capital
∂ lny/∂ lnk =( σ∗ − 1)/σ∗ is higher, ceteris paribus, where the labor force is more
heterogenous –further magnifying the effects of educational disparities. Second, ﬁrms’ choice
of technology involves a dynamic externality that tends to result in an excessively skill-biased14
or ﬂexible technology: each takes the distribution of human capital it faces as given, but
neglects the effects of its own ﬂexibility on workers’ human capital investments, and therefore
on subsequent distributions. A lower σt would reduce current income inequality γt∆t, which
is growth-enhancing given the presence of credit constraints. This would in turn lower the
skill disparities ∆t+k that ﬁrms will face in the future, as well as the costs c(σ∗(∆t+k))
they will bear to adapt to this heterogeneity. Although γt =( σt − 1)/σt also affects in a
somewhat complex way the concavity of educational investment, it is easy to identify cases
(e.g., α =0 ,β =1 )where growth in every period would be higher if ﬁrms collectively chose
less skill-biased technologies.
We now have a model with endogenous institutions and endogenous technology.
Denoting Γ(∆) ≡ (σ∗(∆) − 1)/σ∗(∆), the dynamical system governing the economy’s
evolution becomes
∆t+1 = D(∆t,τt;γt)=D(∆t,T(Γ(∆t)∆t);Γ(∆t)). (6)
This makes clear the presence of important multiplier effects: a transitory shock affecting
inequality (e.g., more idiosyncratic uncertainty) or the political system (e.g., a higher λ) will
be ampliﬁed through technological decisions, the policy choice, and the intergenerational
transmission mechanism, and may thus have drastic long-term effects. Most importantly, in
accounting for changes in inequality one can no longer treat technological and institutional
factors as separate, competing explanations: both are jointly determined, and complementary.
Themodel thus shows how, in the words ofFreeman (1995), one needs to think of “theWelfare
State as a system”.
To demonstrate these points more concretely, I shall assume from here on a piecewise-
linear technological frontier: the function c(σ) is ﬂat up to σL (that much ﬂexibility is “free”),
then has a slope of M>0 up to σH > σL (maximum ﬂexibility), at which point it becomes
vertical. The analogue of Proposition in this case is very simple: the unique technological
outcome is σt = σL when ∆2
t/2M<σ2






H) ﬁrms mix between σL and σH, in proportions such that the resulting factor prices
make each one indifferent.
Consider now two countries, C1 and C2, that are identical in all respects, including
































3.International spillovers between social contracts
a welfare state. Suppose now that the technological frontier gradually ﬂattens (M declines),
meaning that ﬂexibility becomes cheaper to achieve. An intuitive result is that the laissez-faire
country will be the “early adopter” of the more inegalitarian technology. That is, there is a
range [M0,M00] in which nothing happens in C2, while in C1 the more skill-biased technology
σH ﬁrst becomes another feasible equilibrium, and ultimately the only one. Only when M
falls below M0 does a similar transition become feasible, an ultimately inevitable, in C2.
This result may help explain why skill-biased technological changed occurred ﬁrst, and to a
greater extent, in the United States compared to Europe. It also makes apparent the reciprocal
interactions between technology and policy: feasible new technologies are not implemented
unless institutions are (or become) sufﬁciently inegalitarian; conversely, the occurrence of
technological change alters these same institutions.
3.3 Exporting Inequality: Spillovers Between Social Contracts
The model naturally leads us to think about spillovers between national policies or
institutions, via technological diffusion. The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows
how the social contract in Country 2 can, in the long-run, be affected by technological or even
purely political shifts in Country 1, propagated along the channels indicated by solid lines on
the diagram.
The formal analysis is developed in Bénabou (2002), using the above-described model
and the additional assumption that the marginal cost of adapting or copying a more ﬂexible
technology, once it has been developed and implemented in another country, is only m<M .
This lower cost may for instance reﬂect, as in Acemoglu (1998), an imperfect international
enforcement of property rights over technological or organizational innovations.16
I shall discuss here only one scenario, namely the transmission of a political shock.
Having seen earlier how the mere fact of being in different steady states (say, for historical
reasons)can lead tovery differenttechnologicaltrajectories, Ishall assumehere that C1 and C2
both start in the egalitarian steady-state, (¯ τ,γL,D(¯ τ,γL)), with the same technology σL. Let
C1 now experience an increase in the political inﬂuence of wealth, λ. This may reﬂect a rising
importance of lobbying and campaign contributions, an exogenous decline in unionization, or
al o w e relectoral turnout by the poor. As a result of such a shift, redistribution (ﬁscal and/or
educational) in country C1 declines. This leads over time to a rise in human capital inequality,
to which ﬁrms respond by adopting more ﬂexible (and wage-disequalizing) technologies,
switching from γL to γH. Those in C2, which would not have developed such technologies
by themselves, now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to copy them from C1. This results in a rise in income
inequality in C2, and ultimately leads to the unravelling of the Welfare State in that country
as well. Thus, the unique long run outcome is for both countries to switch to the more skill-
biased technology σH and the more unequal social contract τ, ending up at the steady-state
(τ,γH,D(τ;γH)).
4. Conclusion
The work described here identiﬁes important politico-economic mechanisms that allow
alternative societal models to perpetuate themselves, as well as some powerful forces that
push towards uniformization. Among the latter is skill-biased technical change, which can
potentially lead to the unravelling of the Welfare State. When technological or organizational
form is endogenous, moreover, ﬁrms respond to greater human capital heterogeneity with
more ﬂexible technologies, further exacerbating income inequality. On the other hand, the
possibility for ﬁrms in different countries to chose technologies adapted to the local labor
force can make it easier to sustain multiple social models. The international diffusion
of technology, however, implies that more ﬂexible and skill-biased technologies proﬁtably
developed in countries with more unequal social contracts may then be imitated by ﬁrms in
other countries, thereby triggering a “chain reaction” that, again, pushes the whole system
towards an outcome that is more inegalitarian –technologically, economically, and politically
speaking. Such international spillovers between national social contracts are key to the debate
over globalization, and warrant further research.References
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